Some Ethical Considerations About the Use of Biomarkers for the Classification of Adult Antisocial Individuals by Jurjako, Marko et al.
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=ufmh20
International Journal of Forensic Mental Health
ISSN: 1499-9013 (Print) 1932-9903 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ufmh20
Some Ethical Considerations About the Use
of Biomarkers for the Classification of Adult
Antisocial Individuals
Marko Jurjako, Luca Malatesti & Inti A. Brazil
To cite this article: Marko Jurjako, Luca Malatesti & Inti A. Brazil (2018): Some Ethical
Considerations About the Use of Biomarkers for the Classification of Adult Antisocial Individuals,
International Journal of Forensic Mental Health, DOI: 10.1080/14999013.2018.1485188
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/14999013.2018.1485188
© 2018 International Association of Forensic
Mental Health Services. Published by Taylor
& Francis Group, LLC
Published online: 10 Sep 2018.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 325
View Crossmark data
Some Ethical Considerations About the Use of Biomarkers for the
Classification of Adult Antisocial Individuals
Marko Jurjakoa, , Luca Malatestia, , and Inti A. Brazilb,c,d,e
aProject CEASCRO, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Rijeka, Rijeka, Croatia;
bDonders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands; cForensic Psychiatric Centre
Pompestichting, Division Diagnostics Research and Education, Nijmegen, The Netherlands; dCollaborative Antwerp Psychiatric
Research Institute, University of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium; eCentre for Psychology, Behaviour, & Achievement, Faculty of Health and
Life Sciences, Coventry University, Coventry, UK
ABSTRACT
It has been argued that a biomarker-informed classification system for antisocial individuals
has the potential to overcome many obstacles in current conceptualizations of forensic and
psychiatric constructs and promises better targeted treatments. However, some have
expressed ethical worries about the social impact of the use of biological information for
classification. Many have discussed the ethical and legal issues related to possibilities of
using biomarkers for predicting antisocial behavior. We argue that prediction should not
raise the most pressing ethical worries. Instead, issues connected with “biologization”, such
as stigmatization and negative effects on self-image, need more consideration. However, we
conclude that also in this respect there are no principled ethical objections against the use
of biomarkers to guide classification and treatment of adult antisocial individuals.
KEYWORDS
Classification of antisocial
behavior; biomarkers;
bioprediction; ethical
issues; stigma
Introduction
Many individuals with an antisocial personality pre-
sent a social problem that requires an appropriate
response. Such individuals are typified by antisocial
tendencies, such as lack of inhibition, extreme vio-
lence, and aggressive behavior. Studies indicate that
around 50% of the world’s prison population is com-
prised of individuals with antisocial personality dis-
order (ASPD) (Fazel & Danesh, 2002), a broad and
heterogeneous psychiatric diagnosis capturing elevated
proneness toward exhibiting severely antisocial behav-
iors. In the United States, it is estimated that among
the individuals with ASPD, 15–20% also satisfy crite-
ria for psychopathy (Hare, 2003), an even more severe
personality disorder characterized by lack of empathy,
remorse, and guilt, in addition to the more common
antisocial behaviors. Moreover, individuals with psy-
chopathic traits are disproportionately more likely
than any other group of people to commit a crime
and violently recidivate (Kiehl & Hoffman, 2011). In
this respect, they put enormous pressure on our
moral, legal, and economic systems (Kiehl &
Buckholtz, 2010).
Recently, Brazil and colleagues (2018; see also Blair,
2015) have proposed a biomarker-informed classifica-
tion to replace the current classifications of antisocial
individuals. Biomarkers are objective and measurable
characteristics of biological processes that are used for
identifying normal and pathological processes and
responses to different types of medical intervention.
These characteristics can include everything from gene
expression, blood and pulse pressure, brain activation
patterns, or any other measurable process or substance
in the body that affects patients’ health. Current classifi-
cations of antisocial individuals, with their over-reliance
on behavioral tendencies, fail to capture the large
amount of heterogeneity in antisocial populations. This
has precluded the rapid development of effective
responses and therapies for these individuals (Brazil,
van Dongen, Maes, Mars, & Baskin-Sommers, 2018).
The potential of using biomarkers has received a large
amount of attention and has even led to the
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development of frameworks such as the Research
Domain Criteria (RDoC), that aim to redefine the way
psychiatric conditions are viewed (e.g., Buckholtz &
Meyer-Lindenberg, 2012; Insel et al., 2010). The com-
mon aspiration in these proposals is overcoming the
limitations of relying solely on observed behavior to
generate syndrome-based diagnoses, which is the
approach used in currently dominant classificatory sys-
tems, such as the Diagnostic Statistical Manual (DSM:
American Psychiatric Association, 2013) and the
International Statistical Classification of Diseases and
Related Health Problems (ICD; World Health
Organization, 1993).
The introduction of biomarkers for antisocial person-
ality disorders, despite its potential benefits, has raised
several ethical concerns (Singh & Rose, 2009). Some
have considered the possible disruptive consequences of
such classification for current moral and legal practices
of prediction of antisocial behavior (Aharoni et al., 2013;
Nadelhoffer et al., 2012; Nadelhoffer & Sinnott-
Armstrong, 2012; Poldrack et al., 2018; Singh, Sinnott-
Armstrong, & Savulescu, 2014). Other ethical problems
about biomarkers might be raised by the consequences
of what can be called the “biologization” of antisocial
behavior (Horstk€otter, Dondorp, & de Wert, 2015).
These issues involve the dangers of medicalization of
deviant behavior, the stigmatization, and the negative
self-image that might derive from the use of such classifi-
cations (Pickersgill, 2011; Sadler, 2008).
In this article, we argue that the introduction of bio-
marker-based classification of antisocial behavior in
adults should not attract these ethical worries. With
regard to the ethical and legal issues of using bio-
markers for predicting antisocial behavior, we recognize
their importance and discuss some open issues.
However, we maintain that the problem of how
“biologization” relates to stigmatization and negative
self-image deserves more attention. One dimension of
this problem is descriptive and concerns whether and
how these classifications induce stigmatization and
negative self-image and how they will or might be used
in moral, forensic and legal practices. In this article, we
do not address this dimension of the problem. We con-
sider, instead, the conceptual or normative issue
whether there is any rational ground for concluding
that a biomarker-based classification should imply
stigma or affect adversely self-image. We respond in
the negative by arguing that associations between biol-
ogization, stigmatization, and related negative self-
image are empirically and normatively, unjustified.
In the next sections, we will review some problems
related to the current systems of classification and
highlight how the field might benefit from devising
classifications informed by biomarkers. Then, we con-
sider some worries about the prospects of using bio-
markers for prediction of dangerous behavior. Finally,
we reflect on some ethical implications of introducing
biomarker-informed classification as they relate to
“biologization” of antisocial behavior.
It is important to first point out that the scope of this
article is limited to the use of biomarkers for classifying
adult antisocial individuals. Although an increasing
amount of attention is paid to the ethical aspects that are
related to the treatment and classification of antisociality
among the youth (Baum & Savulescu, 2014; Horstk€otter
et al., 2015), there are multiple factors that force us to be
cautious about generalizing our claims across different
age cohorts. One reason is that, due to the complexities
of maturation, it is difficult to predict which children
with conduct problems become antisocial adults. In fact,
a portion of children with early-onset conduct problems
desist when they reach adulthood (e.g., van Domburgh,
Vermeiren, Blokland, & Doreleijers, 2009), indicating
that factors such as brain maturation, environmental
changes, epigenetic changes, and so on, can affect a
child’s developmental trajectory significantly (Brazil,
2015; Fontaine, Rijsdijk, McCrory, & Viding, 2010).
Another factor is that the operationalizations of anti-
social personality constructs differ between children and
adults. For instance, the construct of psychopathy,
denoting a severe type of antisocial personality, includes
interpersonal facets (such as manipulative behavior,
pathological lying, and glibness), while the children’s
analogue of the psychopathy construct does not (Hare,
2003; Viding & McCrory, 2012). This fact introduces
conceptual mismatches between the age cohorts whose
relevance and implications have not been sufficiently
investigated. These examples highlight that it is import-
ant to remain cautious when generalizing across age
cohorts. To avoid further confusions, and in accordance
with prior suggestions based on discordant patterns of
empirical results between antisocial adults and youth
(see Hoppenbrouwers, Bulten, & Brazil, 2016), this art-
icle will be limited to adult antisocial individuals.
Problems in the current systems of
classification of adult antisocial individuals:
psychopathy as an example
Currently, most personality disorders, including the
antisocial personality disorder, are classified by scor-
ing observed behavior and using these scores to make
inferences about unobservable characteristics such as
personality traits. Some of the general reasons for
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dissatisfaction with this type of syndrome-based classi-
fications, as captured by the DSM 5 and ICD, are het-
erogeneity, low construct validity, and the categorical
measurement of disorders (Lilienfeld, 2014; Lilienfeld,
Smith, & Watts, 2013; for a philosophical discussion,
see Murphy 2009). Many constructs of mental disor-
ders capture heterogeneous behavioral and personality
features that cluster together conditions with diverse
sets of symptoms and etiologies. Such constructs tend
to have low validity because they are not very good at
predicting external criteria, such as etiology, perform-
ance in experimental tasks, and responsiveness to
treatment. Finally, DSM conceptualizes disorders as
being clearly outlined, that is, as having a categorical
structure (Haslam, 2014), while research indicates that
most disorders in currently available syndrome-based
diagnostic systems have a dimensional structure
(Haslam, Holland, & Kuppens, 2012). To further
research in this area, many suggest introducing a
more data-driven classification system of psychopath-
ology (e.g., Buckholtz & Meyer-Lindenberg, 2012;
Insel et al., 2010; Lilienfeld, 2014; Stephan, Iglesias,
Heinzle, & Diaconescu, 2015).
Problems related to syndrome-based classification
spill over to the study of antisocial behavior (Skeem,
Polaschek, Patrick, & Lilienfeld, 2011). The most
pressing issue in this regard is that there is currently
no effective therapy for reducing or preventing anti-
social behavior correlated with psychopathy and other
antisocial personality types (Brazil et al., 2018; Salekin,
Worley, & Grimes, 2010; cf. Baskin-Sommers, Curtin,
& Newman, 2015). The reason for the lack of thera-
peutic success seems to lie (at least in part) in the het-
erogeneity and the lack of external validity of the
construct of antisocial personality and its subtypes.
Psychopathy offers a clear example of the struggle for
finding the best way of classifying individuals with
antisocial personality structures. The history of psych-
opathy is permeated with different conceptualizations,
which led to different tools and approaches for meas-
uring psychopathy (Pickersgill, 2012; Skeem et al.,
2011). For instance, Karpman (1941) distinguished
between primary and secondary psychopaths based on
their assumed differences in etiology. He considered
primary psychopaths to be those whose psychopathic
traits and antisocial behavior is genetically deter-
mined. Secondary psychopaths are supposed to be
those whose antisocial behavior is mainly a product of
social environment. More recently, the primary/sec-
ondary distinction was alternatively defined in terms
of variations in anxiety levels. From this perspective,
individuals with psychopathic traits who exhibit low
levels of anxiety are labeled primary and those who
exhibit higher levels are labeled secondary psycho-
paths (Lykken, 1995). These examples indicate that
there are different subtypes of psychopathy that are
likely to differ in their etiology. Importantly, these dis-
tinctions should be reflected in our classification sys-
tems, which would enable devising more effective and
selective diagnostic and treatment tools, and public
policies (Brzovic, Jurjako, & Sustar, 2017; Gonzalez-
Tapia, Obsuth, & Heeds, 2017).
Furthermore, there is disagreement on what the
core traits of psychopathy are and how to measure
them (Lilienfeld, 2013). For instance, some insist that
antisocial behavior belongs to the construct of psych-
opathy (Hare, 2003), while others think that antisocial
behavior might be correlated with psychopathy, but it
is not a core feature (Cooke & Michie, 2001;
Med-edovic, Petrovic, Kujacic, -Doric, & Savic, 2015).
These conflicts in conceptualizations of psychopathy
led to devising different measures and conceptualiza-
tions of psychopathy (for an overview see Brazil &
Cima, 2016; Brazil et al., 2018). For instance, some
researchers emphasize the distinction between success-
ful and unsuccessful psychopaths (Glenn & Raine,
2014). Successful psychopaths are supposed to be
characterized by elevated interpersonal (e.g., deceitful,
manipulative, liars) and affective (unempathic, callous,
glib, etc.) traits, but they do not exhibit extreme anti-
social and violent behavior. Unsuccessful psychopaths
are supposed to be those who also possess, to a rela-
tively higher degree, antisocial and impulsive traits.
Different conceptualizations and measurements of
psychopathy have led to divergent results with respect
to its external correlates. A highly indicative example
of this is Baskin-Sommers et al.’s (2015) study where
they show that the same group of incarcerated psy-
chopathic offenders, depending on which measure of
psychopathy is used, exhibit different correlations
with executive functions. Among other things, their
study showed that a self-report scale capturing
Fearless Dominance, a broad construct believed to
measure the core interpersonal-affective features of
psychopathy, correlated positively with task-based
measures of executive function in a group of
offenders. In contrast, no correlations were found
between executive function and core interpersonal-
affective psychopathic traits measured with another
instrument known as the Psychopathy Checklist-
Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 2003) in the same group. This
example illustrates how the instruments used in a
study can affect empirical results.
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Thus, the different attempts at characterising
psychopathy are clear manifestations of the ongoing
struggle to find better ways to operationalize antisocial
personality constructs. It is likely that this challenge,
as well as a lack of external validity and robust corre-
lations with different neurocognitive deficits, has hin-
dered devising efficacious treatment. A promising way
out of these methodological and research difficulties is
to take a more data-driven or bottom-up approach
(e.g., Insel & Cuthbert, 2015; Lilienfeld, 2014; Stephan
et al., 2015). Numerous genetic, developmental, and
neuroscientific studies correlate various aspects of
antisocial behavior with neurocognitive abnormalities
and deficits (for a survey, see Brazil et al., 2018).
Instead of trying to ground different psychologically
or behaviorally defined symptoms of antisocial and
psychopathic behavior in biological and cognitive (i.e.,
biocognitive) data, the alternative is to start with the
biological and cognitive data that are correlated with
antisocial behavior and rebuild the classification bot-
tom-up.
The biocognitive approach to classification of
antisocial behavior
Given the very limited successes in treatment, and
psychometric results pointing to the heterogeneity
among antisocial individuals, many researchers are
proposing biology and cognition based classifications
(Blair, 2015; Brazil et al., 2018; Buckholtz & Meyer-
Lindenberg, 2012, Stephan et al., 2015). Brazil and
colleagues (2018), inspired by the NIH’s Research
domain criteria (RDoC) project (Insel et al., 2010),
propose to rebuild the classification of antisocial indi-
viduals by relying on genetic, neurobiological, and
cognitive data obtained from individuals that engage
in antisocial behavior.
The envisioned reclassification cannot avoid begin-
ning with antisocial behavior that is delineated by
relying on common practices. This includes delineat-
ing a group of individuals that have consistently
shown disruptive behaviors that deviate from the soci-
etal norms (Sadler, 2008). At this stage, antisociality is
clearly demarcated by moral and social criteria, since
these individuals are normally individuated among the
people who are already committed to forensic institu-
tions due to exhibiting repeated and severe forms of
antisocial behavior (Pickersgill, 2012). In addition to
the traditional symptom-driven and psychology-based
diagnostic manuals, such as the DSM’s construct of
antisocial personality disorder and Hare’s Psychopathy
checklist (Hare, 2003), or the more recent Triarchic
model of psychopathy (Patrick, Fowles, & Krueger,
2009), Brazil and colleagues (2018) propose to use
biomarkers correlated with different forms of anti-
social behavior to produce what they call specific bio-
cognitive fingerprints of antisocial offenders.
Biocognitive fingerprinting integrates different
types of data spanning from genetics, neuroimaging
and cognitive/behavioral studies, to obtain a better
description of the commonalities and differences
between various types of antisocial individuals. This
approach involves using data mining algorithms that,
by combining different types of data, identify combi-
nations of (neuro)biological and genetic markers to
build biocognitive profiles that best describe individu-
als with similar biocognitive characteristics, while at
the same time maximizing the difference with individ-
uals with other biocognitive profiles. Within a profile,
an individual is scored along the axes of the relevant
dimensions included in the biocognitive profile, thus
creating a unique signature or biocognitive finger-
print, for each individual (see Figure 2 in Brazil
et al., 2018).
There are increasing data that suggest that neuro-
biological and cognitive dysfunctions distinguish psy-
chopathic behavior from other forms of antisocial
behavior (Brazil, 2015). For example, studies indicate
that psychopathy, as measured by the PCL-R, is linked
to abnormal functioning of brain regions that sub-
serve emotional processing underlying empathic reac-
tions, decision-making, and moral judgment (e.g.,
Anderson & Kiehl, 2012; Blair, 2013). Most notably,
the amygdala, the ventromedial (VMPF) and orbito-
frontal cortex (OFC) (Blair, 2008), and the extended
neural circuitry that is related to the broader paralim-
bic area of the brain (Kiehl, 2006) are among these
regions. Functional MRI research also found, for
example, reduced activity in the anterior cingulate
cortex, the anterior insula and ventral striatum in
offenders with comorbid ASPD and psychopathy rela-
tive to those with only ASPD (Gregory et al., 2015;
Hosking et al., 2017). The correlation of psychopathic
traits with dysregulation of attentional processes is
another prominent example of cognitive deficiencies
believed to differentiate this group from other anti-
social populations. When psychopaths’ primary atten-
tional focus is directed to a response set (perceptually
accessible choice options), then the secondary or per-
ipheral stimuli that are outside of that response set do
not impact their decision-making processes. This
could account for the disinhibition and maladaptive
decision-making often seen in psychopathy (Koenigs
& Newman, 2013). In sum, these studies indicate that
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psychopathic antisocial behavior can be conceptual-
ized and classified along the lines of dysfunctions in
different (neuro)biological and cognitive systems (see,
also, Hamilton, Hiatt Racer, & Newman, 2015), and
that the nature of these impairments seem to distin-
guish among groups to some extent.
Interestingly, there are some preliminary, but very
promising results of therapies targeting cognitive func-
tions to mitigate dispositions underpinning antisocial
behavior. Cognitive remediation therapy (CRT) is a
tailored approach to treatment that aims to improve
cognitive skills (e.g., attention, memory) by letting
patients repeatedly perform tasks that engage the tar-
get cognitive functions that require enhancement or
better regulation. Baskin-Sommers, Curtain and
Newman (2015) designed a CRT-based intervention to
improve cognitive deficits that are specific to psycho-
pathic and non-psychopathic offenders, respectively.
Their approach was based on the evidence showing
that psychopaths exhibit deficits in modulating atten-
tion when there are multiple sources of information
needed to solve a task, while other offenders exhibit
aberrant responses to affective and motivationally rele-
vant stimuli, but not in modulating attention. The
therapy consisted of a condition in which trainings
matched deficits associated with each of the two
groups of offenders and a condition in which train-
ings meant for attention processing were applied to
offenders with aberrant affective processing and vice
versa. They found significant improvement of the tar-
geted cognitive functions, but only when the training
matched the cognitive deficit typical of the specific
group (i.e., attention vs. affective regulation).
These results are promising, and indicate that clas-
sifying and studying antisocial offenders according to
their biocognitive characteristics may facilitate the
development of more tailored treatments for other
deficiencies too. Still, it is important to consider
potential ethical consequences of such endeavours. In
the next section, we begin discussing some ethical
worries that these types of approaches may
bring about.
Ethical concerns about the bioprediction of
antisocial behavior
Several authors have raised and discussed ethical wor-
ries concerning predicting criminal or other kind of
harmful behavior on the basis of biomarkers
(Nadelhoffer et al., 2012; Nadelhoffer & Sinnott-
Armstrong, 2012; Poldrack et al., 2018; Singh et al.,
2014). In this regard, the MAOA gene, which was
initially found to be highly correlated with antisocial
behavior, has long been considered a potential bio-
marker for antisociality, and has captured the atten-
tion of many ethicists (Baum, 2013; Baum &
Savulescu, 2014). The MAOA gene has long and short
variants and encodes a monoamine oxidase A enzyme
that regulates monoamine neurotransmitters, such as
dopamine, serotonin and norepinephrine. The main
function of the MAOA enzyme is to decompose
monoamine neurotransmitters. There is evidence that
dysregulated production of serotonin is correlated
with impulsive and violent behavior (Coccaro, 1989).
Thus, failures of MAOA gene to produce enzymes
that regulate the production of serotonin seem to be
(partly) responsible for a higher risk for violent behav-
ior in individuals with mutations in the MAOA gene
(Brunner, Nelen, Breakefield, Ropers, & van
Oost, 1993).
The discovery of the links between the MAOA
gene and antisocial behavior sparked considerable dis-
cussion on the ethical implications of using this gene
as a biomarker for predicting risk of developing disor-
ders and for predicting future behavior. One key find-
ing is that individual biomarkers seem to have little
predictive power (Singh & Rose, 2009; Brazil et al.,
2018). For instance, Caspi and colleagues (Caspi et al.
2002) provided evidence that only the long variant of
the MAOA gene is a predictor of greater risk for anti-
social behavior, but only among individuals who suf-
fered from serious forms of abuse during childhood.
In addition, genes that correlate with psychopathology
often have pleiotropic effects that cut across current
psychiatric taxonomy (Buckholtz & Meyer-
Lindenberg, 2012). This means that the same gene
expression patterns can have similar or different
(neural) manifestations, depending on the environ-
mental conditions and the way these interact with
genes. This could be one explanation for another,
more specific, problem pertaining to the current lack
of robustness of the genetic and neuroscientific data.
Empirical findings justify ethical concerns about
the suitability of using current biological information,
such as expression of the MAOA gene, to discover
biomarkers that help classify, treat, predict and
respond to antisocial behavior. However, worrying
about the possible consequences of reliable biopredic-
tion is premature. In fact, different studies have
shown opposite correlations between different variants
of the MAOA gene and antisocial behavior. Some
studies have failed to replicate positive correlation
between the gene and antisociality (Haberstick et al.,
2005; Huizinga et al., 2006). Furthermore, mutations
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in the MAOA gene have been associated with psychi-
atric conditions that are not typically linked to anti-
social personality, such as autism, schizophrenia,
depression and bipolar disorder (Buckholtz & Meyer-
Lindenberg, 2014). The inconsistent results regarding
the MAOA gene is only one example of how the
search for individual genes that can be used as bio-
markers for psychopathology has failed to deliver the
expected results. It seems likely that the heterogeneity
among individuals showing antisocial behavior will
preclude the identification of isolated genes that can
serve as biomarkers in the near future.
In general, assessing whether the application of bio-
prediction in many legal and social practices is prema-
ture involves addressing several issues. Firstly, there
are relevant legal debates aimed at establishing when
scientific predictive information, not necessarily of a
biological kind, can be usefully used for initial sen-
tencing, parole or rehabilitation monitoring (Douglas,
Pugh, Singh, Savulescu, & Fazel, 2017; H€ubner &
White, 2016; Pugh & Douglas, 2016). Secondly, the
ethical justification of application of bioprediction in
particular might tolerate different reliability thresholds
depending on the specific context and the balance of
values at hand. Generally, the conflicting values tend
to oppose the interests of an individual patient or
offender and the interests of the wider public
(Douglas et al., 2017). Depending on the context we
might give more weight to one value over the other
and accordingly tolerate prediction tools with specific
features. For instance, when deciding on a preventive
commitment to a psychiatric or prison institution of a
person who has already served her full sentence we
should rely on tools and data that minimize the rate
of false positives. Namely, we should avoid assessment
tools that could prolong incarceration of those who
bear predictive markers but are not prone to violent
behavior anymore. On the other hand, when deciding
on a parole release, even if we mistakenly predict that
an individual will continue to be violent still the
incarceration time would be within the limits of the
original sentence. Thus, in the parole case, we might
prefer tools and data that minimize the rate of false
negatives because we might give more precedence to
securing the public safety (Douglas et al., 2017).
Nonetheless, regarding adults, bioprediction practi-
ces that would involve serious involuntary interference
on personal freedom such as preventive incarceration,
sentencing based on risk assessment, and mandatory
treatments appear to be premature. In fact, arguably,
these practices have and ought to have a very low tol-
erance for predictive error (Eastman & Campbell,
2006; H€ubner & White, 2016). Without giving an
exhaustive discussion, there are at least four sets of
reasons indicating that presently most methods for
predicting risky antisocial behavior, including biopre-
diction, do not satisfy such a requirement (see also
Poldrack et al., 2018). Let us consider them.
The first set of reasons emerges within the issue of
extrapolating group-level knowledge to generate infer-
ences about the individual (Dawid, 2017). An import-
ant aspect of this problem is that the law targets the
propensity of an individual to commit some unlawful
action in the future, or her legal responsibility for a
specific action. In contrast, scientific investigations
commonly use data that are aggregated across individ-
uals to reach general conclusions about the features
exhibited by whole populations (Eastman & Campbell,
2006). Buckholtz and Faigman (2014) have given a
hypothetical example of the problem caused by
‘group-to-individual’ extrapolation, in which they
examined results from neuroimaging studies of lying.
At the group level, lying seems to be associated with
increased activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(DLPFC). However, not every individual who lies
exhibits this neural pattern. Some do not exhibit this
pattern at all, while some even exhibit the opposite
pattern of activity in DLPFC. Focusing on the average
DLPFC activation across individuals will obscure the
detection of the individual differences. Thus, group
average data do not guarantee conclusions about all
individuals who form the group.
The second problem with the bioprediction of
criminal behavior stems from more general methodo-
logical challenges in the empirical research. Current
actuarial risk-assessment tools have a large margin of
error when they are applied to obtain risk estimates of
individuals’ propensity for future violence (Douglas
et al., 2017; Hart, Michie, & Cooke, 2007). Large mar-
gins of error make it difficult to estimate with cer-
tainty the probability that an individual will act
violently. Thus, Hart et al. (2007) warn that risk-
assessment tools should be used with great caution or
not used at all. Similar issues may be raised regarding
the inclusion of biomarkers for estimating an individ-
ual’s risk for engaging in violent behavior (for a dis-
cussion, see Monahan, 2014).
A third issue is that science and the law use differ-
ent levels of description and explanation of human
behavior (Buckholtz & Faigman, 2014; Francken &
Slors, 2018). The law uses higher-order constructs
such as ‘justice’, ‘social dangerousness’ or
‘responsibility’ that apply to the level of a person,
while neuroscientists talk about neurons and neural
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networks that are described in biochemical and mech-
anistic terms (Campbell & Eastman, 2014). Often, it is
not clear how constructs from one level or domain
should be translated and implemented in the other
(Buckholtz & Faigman, 2014; Jurjako & Malatesti,
2017). Thus, often the correlation of biomarkers with
some behaviors has not clear implications for higher-
order legal constructs. Similar considerations apply to
predicting dangerousness in legal contexts based on
biomarker information. If there is uncertainty about
the proper translation of biomarker information into
higher-order or legal terms, then there is a potential
danger of misconstruing the relevance of this informa-
tion in legal and social practices. These issues are all
relevant in the context of the admissibility of evidence
in legal proceedings, where standards of permissible
evidence tend to be more stringent given the greater
preference of the courts for avoiding punishing the
innocent instead of the guilty (Campbell & Eastman,
2014). In this context, the dangers of using bio-
markers include creating a wrong impression of their
reliability and relevance for prediction that people
intuitively, although without proper grounds, impute
to scientific results that utilize this vocabulary.
The inappropriate use of biomarkers of antisocial
behavior in the present context might lead to the fur-
ther problem of committing the so called “psycho-
legal fallacy”. This is the mistake of assuming that
“identifying a biomechanical cause by itself excuses
behavior” (Aspinwall, Brown, & Tabery, 2012, p. 847).
Given that, ultimately, all behavior is underpinned by
some causal factor, this claim would imply that
nobody is accountable for his/her behavior (see
Morse, 2000). One variant of the psycho-legal fallacy
is thinking erroneously that any kind of salient struc-
tural brain difference indicates a legally relevant
impairment or incapacity. Determining dangerousness
of an individual and reliably predicting his/her behav-
ior requires establishing whether the offender had the
relevant capacity to control his/her actions (Poldrack
et al., 2018). This cannot always be established just by
using biological and cognitive data. For instance,
patients whose Corpus Callosum (a bundle of fibers
connecting the brain hemispheres) had to be surgi-
cally removed and those who are born without it have
similar brain structures. Nevertheless, because of the
brain’s plasticity, cognitive functions relying on the
Corpus Callosum can be carried out by other brain
structures. Thus, despite having similar brain morph-
ology, individuals born without Corpus Callosum are
less cognitively and behaviorally impaired than
patients who had it removed due to illness (Jeeves,
1996). This indicates that not every brain difference is
pertinent to establish whether a legally relevant cap-
acity is present (see Jurjako & Malatesti, 2018).
The fourth set of reasons for scepticism about bio-
prediction of antisocial behavior arises from the fact
that current empirical research indicates that most
psychiatric disorders, as currently conceptualized,
denote heterogeneous causal and symptomatic struc-
tures (Haslam et al., 2012). If it were the case that
psychiatric disorders denote “distinct, independent
[entities] with a unique set of causal factors and
pathophysiological processes” (Buckholtz & Meyer-
Lindenberg, 2012, p. 993), then there would be a
greater chance of finding biomarkers that could
uniquely predict features related to that disorder.
However, it is generally recognized that most psychi-
atric disorders exhibit a dimensional structure (Baum,
2016; Buckholtz & Meyer-Lindenberg, 2012). This
explains why in current taxonomies of psychopath-
ology in general, and taxonomy of antisocial personal-
ity disorders in particular, there will be biomarkers
that are common to many different conditions and
disorders that do not necessarily share other personal-
ity or behavioral features (Buckholtz & Meyer-
Lindenberg, 2012; Lilienfeld, 2014). Thus, we should
not expect that certain biomarkers will have high pre-
dictive value given our current taxonomy of disorders.
The main reason seems to be that current approaches
to distinguish among antisocial individuals are based
on behaviorally defined categorizations, insofar they
involve the description of specific behaviors and a
reliance on behavior to infer mental states and per-
sonality traits, which do not often map onto unique
or nicely delineated biological processes, mechanisms,
or traits (Poldrack et al., 2018).
All these issues indicate that using biomarker-
informed classification for prediction of future behav-
ior might be premature. Importantly, however, we do
not claim that biomarkers should not be used at all
for prediction or that they are useless in this respect
(cf. Baum & Savulescu, 2014). For instance, the pre-
dictive power of biomarkers is increased when they
are combined with other risk factors and environmen-
tal data, such as family history (Singh & Rose, 2009).
In this regard, a great deal of ethical reflection has
already been devoted to thinking and devising social
policies for early prevention in children at risk of
engaging in severe antisocial behavior (Baum &
Savulescu, 2014; Horstk€otter et al., 2015).
To sumarize, the research on bioprediction of anti-
social behavior, despite its intrinsic and instrumental
value, presently does not appear to offer results that
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH 7
imply a significant impact on our legal and other nor-
mative practices (for suggestions how to improve the
practices of bioprediction, see Poldrack et al., 2018).
Thus, although we do not dismiss the relevance of
ethical reflection on the appropriateness of using bio-
markers for prediction, there might be other uses of
biomarkers that deserve to be objects of ethical inves-
tigation. In the next section, we will examine some
ethical issues related to using biomarker-informed
classifications.
Some ethical issues regarding the biocognitive
reclassification of antisocial behavior
Some scholars have expressed worries about the
“biologization” of mental disorders (e.g., Haslam,
2014; Pescosolido et al., 2010; Phelan, 2005). There
are some principal concerns about “biologization”.
First, one worry about biologization is that it creates a
false impression that forensic and psychiatric condi-
tions can be reduced to clearly delineated biological
categories. In fact, the prospects of successfully
grounding psychiatric classifications on biological fac-
tors are not good because most mental disorders, as
they are currently classified and conceptualized, are
heterogeneous and exhibit a dimensional structure
(Haslam et al., 2012). However, the goal of biology-
informed proposals for the classification of antisocial
behavior is not to “biologize” current classification
systems of mental disorders, but rather to encourage a
reclassification of antisocial behavior based on biocog-
nitive data. This could include devising new categories
of subtypes of antisocial behavior with a prospect of
individualization and creation of biocognitive finger-
prints of groups of antisocial offenders that would
enable tailor-made therapies (Brazil et al., 2018).
Worries about the medicalization of
antisocial behavior
A related worry is that reliance on biomarkers will
encourage illegitimate forms of medicalization. Ethical
and empirical issues related to medicalization are
multifaceted (Rose, 2007). In our case, the worry
might be that biomarker-based classification forces
“understanding of behavior as mainly caused by vari-
ous biological features” (Horstk€otter et al., 2015, p.
288) that require medico-pharmacological solutions
and therapies (Pickersgill, 2011; Rose, 2007).
There are two important considerations that allevi-
ate the seriousness of this worry. First, it seems that
medicalization is considered morally dubious mostly
when there are available other, non-medical forms, of
treatment that reduce problems by reducing social
and environmental factors underpinning some prob-
lematic condition (Horstk€otter et al., 2015). In the
case of the most severe forms of antisocial behavior,
there seem to be no known feasible therapies that
solely rely on reducing the environmental risk factors.
This is one of the reasons for thinking about recon-
ceptualization of the category according to certain
salient biomarkers (Brazil et al., 2018; see also
Pickersgill, 2011). Moreover, supporters of therapies
based on biocognitive fingerprinting neither necessar-
ily utilize medico-pharmacological means nor down-
play the importance of the environmental factors
(Pickersgill, 2009). In fact, the above-mentioned cog-
nitive-remediation therapy study (Baskin-Sommers
et al., 2015), for example, is based on the knowledge
of cognitive mechanisms that differentiate between
two groups of individuals with antisocial personality
structures. Thus, no medical or pharmacological com-
pounds were required for successful treatment
to occur.
Stigmatization and biomarker-based classification
of antisocial behavior
Another kind of worry concerns the practical conse-
quences of adopting a more biologically informed tax-
onomy. In the case of the framework proposed by
Brazil et al. (2018), these worries are most notably
related to the stigmatization of individuals classified
by using biocognitive fingerprints. Stigmatization in
this context refers to the social consequences of using
labels that might have socially undesirable implica-
tions for the groups of people receiving such labels. A
related problem is that being so labeled might nega-
tively affect the self-image of the individual. Before
addressing these issues, some clarifications are needed.
Clearly, we should distinguish between justified
forms of censorious and punitive social responses that
would in certain ways set individuals apart from the
rest of the society, and unjustified forms of stigma.
Individuals prone to severe antisocial behavior will be
rightly a target of certain restrictive measures for their
misconduct because they violate other people’s rights
and undermine the norms of fair cooperation
(Baccarini & Malatesti, 2017; see, also, Glenn,
Focquaert, & Raine, 2015). We expect that biomarker-
based classification will improve the chances of devis-
ing, in principle, just responses to such individuals in
terms of effective treatment and rehabilitation oppor-
tunities. However, they should not be stigmatized
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because of misconceptions about the nature of bio-
marker information pertaining to each individual.
There is some empirical evidence that might
authorize the conclusion that biomarker-based classifi-
cation might exacerbate the stigmatization of anti-
social individuals. For instance, former offenders, who
are labeled as such, have difficulty finding employ-
ment, housing, and successfully reintegrating into the
normal fabric of social life. These factors are all corre-
lated with recidivism (Chiricos, Barrick, Bales, &
Bontrager, 2007). Some studies show that using bio-
logical explanations of mental disorders make people
less inclined to ascribe responsibility and blame to the
patients, but they also express fear related to their
unpredictability and dangerousness, and thus a prefer-
ence for more social distance from the patients
(Kvaale, Gottdiener, & Haslam, 2013). It is important
to stress that these researches concern mostly depres-
sion and schizophrenia. Regarding adults with anti-
social personality, studies indicate that people perceive
a specific individual that has been described as having
psychopathic traits as being more prone to engage in
antisocial behavior in the future (e.g., Aspinwall et al.,
2012; Edens, Desforges, Fernandez, & Palac, 2004,
Edens, Colwell, Desforges, & Fernandez, 2005).
Some limited empirical evidence discourages
assuming that biomarker-based classification might
have negative effects on self-image. In a landmark
pilot study, Horstk€otter and colleagues (2012) found
that juvenile delinquents do not exhibit negative self-
image effects that would lead to self-fulfilling prophe-
cies, even when their diagnoses were correlated with
biomarkers such as low cardiac activity. Although the
juveniles in the study expressed concerns about pos-
sible stigmatization, they did not see their psychiatric
diagnoses as part of their personalities. Nor did they
rationalize or explain their criminal behavior by using
psychiatric diagnoses. Instead, the diagnoses were
“meaningless to them” (Horstk€otter, Berghmans, de
Ruiter, Krumeich, & de Wert, 2012, p. 291). New
empirical studies on self-image and stigmatization
might further show how biocognitive classification
and explanations of antisocial behavior may influence
self-image.
Biocognitive classifications and essentialism
Besides researching empirically whether people might
associate biocognitive classifications with stigma and
negative self-image, there is another relevant line of
investigation. We should also investigate which rea-
sons might lead people to associate biomarker-based
classification with unjustified stigma and negative self-
image. Let us consider which type of considerations
might support such an association.
Some claim that devising biocognitive classifica-
tions of antisocial behavior might encourage essential-
ist thinking about these conditions (Dar-Nimrod &
Heine, 2011; Haslam, 2011, 2014; Phelan, 2005).
Essentialism implies that all behaviors related to men-
tal disorders depend on a fixed and immutable nature.
This view derives from the fact that people tend to
essentialize many everyday categories that govern our
thought and actions (Gelman, 2003). For instance,
according to Haslam “people tend to believe that
some social categories—especially those based on gen-
der, race, and ethnicity—have defining properties and
are biologically based, discrete, historically invariant,
and immutable” (Haslam, 2014, p. 23). These attitudes
toward social categories have ethically negative effects
since they increase racial and gender-based prejudice,
reinforce social divisions and antagonistic attitudes
towards outgroup members (Dar-Nimrod & Heine,
2011). Similar attitudes get reinforced regarding psy-
chiatric conditions, in which case the explanation
would be that lay people tend to essentialize mental
disorders as categorical and discrete and underpinned
by biological causes (Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011;
Hinshaw, 2007).
Thus, the worry might be that attempting to reclas-
sify different disorders along the lines of current
knowledge of biocognitive signatures correlated with
different symptoms “is likely to encourage stigma
because it represents sufferers as categorically abnor-
mal, immutably afflicted, and essentially different”
(Haslam, 2014, pp. 24–25). In addition, it might
encourage in the society at large regarding such
behaviors as predetermined and antisocial individuals
as natural born criminals (Glenn et al., 2015; Jalava,
Griffiths, & Maraun, 2015). Furthermore, the pessim-
ism about treatability of biologically or cognitively
construed disorders might, in turn, affect self-identify-
ing beliefs and self-image of individuals with psychi-
atric diagnosis in a way that triggers self-fulfilling
prophecies (Kvaale, Haslam, & Gottdiener, 2013).
However, finding biocognitive signatures does not
sit well with psychological essentialist prejudices. The
studies on biomarkers are not primarily about the
genetic make-ups that determine antisocial behavior.
In that regard, there is no inclination towards genetic
determinism (Buckholtz & Meyer-Lindenberg, 2014).
This research program also incorporates insights from
studies indicating that antisocial behavior is a result of
a complex interaction between environment, genes,
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and neurodevelopmental factors (Brazil, 2015). Even
in the case of psychopathy, whose core traits seem to
have a genetic basis, antisocial behavior seems to be a
product of those genes in combination with external
factors such as having an adverse early childhood
(Gao, Raine, Chan, Venables, & Mednick, 2010).
Furthermore, biocognitive fingerprints mostly denote
correlations, and not causal factors, that necessarily
lead to antisocial behavior. In this respect, there is
also no inclination for thinking that whatever bio-
markers are found will deterministically influence the
behavior of individuals.
It might be objected that the promise of the bio-
marker-based classification for devising effective
therapies can only be delivered on the supposition
that biomarkers deterministically cause antisocial
behavior. If the etiology of antisocial behavior involves
complex interactions between the environmental,
developmental, and biocognitive factors, then reclassi-
fying antisocial individuals according to specific bio-
markers cannot be expected to produce better
therapies. This objection, however, presupposes that
the only way of treating a condition is by acting on
its total causal etiology.
However, this is not the case. For instance, a per-
son might experience different kinds of physical and
psychological distress due to paraplegia. Given that we
have no effective medical therapy for removing the
main cause of the person’s distress, we still have
options for alleviating his/her distress. Most notably,
this involves adjusting the social and physical environ-
ment so to adapt it to his/her needs. Similarly, the
proposal to reclassify antisocial individuals based on
their biocognitive features ultimately aims to uncover
biocognitive profiles of different types of traits corre-
lated with antisocial behavior, which can be used to
develop suitable individualized therapies that are cur-
rently lacking (Brazil et al., 2018). This approach ena-
bles us to target specific features underlying antisocial
behavior in a piecemeal fashion, disentangling prox-
imal and distal factors that comprise the complex bio-
social underpinnings of different forms of antisocial
behavior. For instance, knowing that some subgroup
of psychopaths exhibits deficits in decision-making
that are correlated with specific attentional and neural
aberrations (Moul, Killcross, & Dadds, 2012) enables
us to try to devise techniques for reducing these spe-
cific aberrations that influence maladaptive behavior
(Baskin-Sommers et al., 2015). This way of proceeding
does not presuppose that we act on the total complex
causal process underlying the etiology of severe forms
of antisociality.
Biomarkers and opportunities for change
Biocognitive fingerprinting should not have negative
stigma effects because, in general, having the oppor-
tunity to represent biocognitive traits underlying one’s
condition as external to the self may enable an indi-
vidual to take measures against it (Ross, 2007; cf.
Malatesti & Jurjako, 2016, p. 94–96). For instance, dis-
covering that mood changes are mainly due to a
chemical imbalance in the brain enables the person to
take control over it and act on the causes of his/her
undesirable condition. Something he/she could not
have done before this information was acquired.
Similarly, if attentional deficits and its underlying
neural correlates affect psychopaths’ maladaptive
behavior, then learning about and objectifying it can
be used by an individual to try to remedy it through
therapy (see Baskin-Sommers et al., 2015). Thus,
learning about biocognitive correlates or causes of
one’s behavior can help to objectify the problem, and
motivate the individual to try and find a solution
for it.
It should be acknowledged, however, that the latter
might not apply to all forms of antisocial behavior.
For instance, it is an open issue whether psychopathic
individuals who, due to their lack of empathy, guilt-
lessness, grand sense of self and defiant attitudes,
would be prone to actively engage in remedying their
behavior through therapy (H€ubner & White, 2016; for
other challenges of this type, see Poldrack et al.,
2018). In this regard, some authors and studies pro-
vide more optimistic results (Horstk€otter et al., 2012).
In fact, some experts indicate that, despite negative
impressions, such individuals would be willing or
more motivated to actively engage in different forms
of therapies that aim at modifying the antisocial
aspects of their behavior if it is made clear to them
that the therapy and the modifications it will lead to
are in their best interest (Hare, 2003).
Others, more pessimistically, maintain that for psy-
chopaths to be motivated to take control of the bio-
markers that influence their antisocial behavior
amounts to thoroughly changing personalities or
“world views” of psychopathic individuals (Maibom,
2014). However, in that case, we would be entitled to
react to them with justified forms of disapproving
attitudes. Not because biomarkers associated with psy-
chopathic and antisocial traits are essential or immut-
able. But because our moral and legal practices would
treat such persons as choosing behaviors and ways of
life (Jurjako & Malatesti, 2017) that cause in others
understandable and justifiable attitudes of fear and a
preference for social distance, which are often used in
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the operationalization of stigma (Haslam, 2014). Thus,
due to their criminal and non-cooperative behavior,
certain discriminatory reactions, such as restrictions
of freedom and opportunities and compulsory forms
of rehabilitative therapy, would be sanctioned by the
law or morality (for a more detailed discussion of this
issue, see Baccarini & Malatesti, 2017).
To recapitulate our discussion, our conclusion is
that the introduction of biomarker-based classification
of antisocial behaviors should not be resisted on the
basis of ethical objections concerning “biologization”,
such as stigma or negative self-image. However, our
discussion leaves untouched several serious issues,
and, thus, it should be appreciated that our conclusion
is circumscribed. We describe these further problems
in the following section.
Open issues
An important issue that needs to be addressed con-
cerns the possibility that people in fact would stigma-
tize those who are diagnosed or classified based on
biomarker information despite lacking normative
foundations for these attitudes. Properly addressing
the latter issue requires further investigation of how
to devise public policies that narrow the potential gap
between our normative argument and people’s actual
attitudes about the significance of biocognitive
markers characterizing individuals with antisocial per-
sonality structures. We argued that biomarker-based
classification of antisocial behavior does not warrant
worries related to medicalization, stigmatization, and
essentialism. The question remains how to use these
theoretical insights to effectively shape public opinion.
This is an important problem of great empirical and
practical complexity. Thus, to set public policies
regarding the treatment of antisocial behavior and
communicating the relevant scientific and normative
arguments to the public, further ethical discussions
are needed. These discussions should be sensitive to
the trade-offs between the reliability and the precision
of the currently available science and its impact on
the wellbeing and intrinsic rights of the relevant
groups of people (Kitcher, 2001). We believe that fur-
ther sociological and psychological investigation is
needed before this implication can be addressed prop-
erly (Pickersgill, 2012).
Another set of issues that still need to be
addressed relate to the empirical reliability of avail-
able science and its ethical implications. For instance,
some have claimed that psychopathy is characterized
by diminished experience of fear, which might be
one of the factors influencing their imperviousness
to aversive learning as well as the altered develop-
ment of normal capacities underlying control and
moral sense (Blair, Mitchell, & Blair, 2005; Glenn,
Raine, & Laufer, 2011). If this is the case, then we
might consider devising therapies that could restore
normal experience of fear, especially if this would
enable mitigation of antisocial tendencies correlated
with psychopathy.
However, a prerequisite for thinking about this issue
is to answer some empirical and ethical questions. First,
the question is whether we have reliable skills and
secure technology to produce treatments of this type
(Harris, 2011; Persson & Savulescu, 2012). Second, we
have to be confident in the precision of the empirical
results and theories that are used to ground treatments
and ethical policies. This point is nicely illustrated with
the case of psychopathy. Despite the common opinion
that psychopaths have impairments in subjectively expe-
riencing fear, there is no conclusive evidence showing
this (Hoppenbrouwers et al., 2016). Instead, the deficits
seem to involve mechanisms underlying responses to
threatening stimuli (Brazil et al., 2018; Koenigs &
Newman, 2013). And, third, even if the first two condi-
tions are satisfied we still have to answer the ethical
question whether it would be ethically correct to use
such treatments. Remaining with our current example,
if somebody does not experience fear, or experiences it
to a lesser degree, then undergoing therapy for remedy-
ing this abnormality would likely involve inducing
unpleasant and aversive sensations, among other things.
Thus, we would have to decide whether it is ethically
permissible to use such therapies even if they were
technologically and practically feasible. These are the
questions that in the future research will need to be
addressed more thoroughly (Harris, 2011).
Finally, there are important open ethical questions
concerning how to deliver the treatment that bio-
marker-based classifications might afford. In fact,
this type of classification could enable us to intervene
with biological means in the moral capacities of the
agent (Glannon, 2014; Persson & Savulescu, 2012).
Whether and how we should intervene on these
human capacities is a debated issue amongst ethicists
(Baccarini & Malatesti 2017, 2017; Douglas, 2014;
Harris, 2011; H€ubner & White, 2016; Pugh &
Douglas, 2016; Shaw, 2013).
Conclusion
There are empirical and theoretical reasons for intro-
ducing a biomarker-based classification for adult
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antisocial individuals. It can be concluded that bio-
marker-based classification has the potential to pro-
vide new avenues and opportunities for devising
effective treatments.
We have argued that two principal ethical worries
about this type of classifications can be defused. First,
given the limited knowledge of biomarkers’ predictive
value and the structure of our judiciary systems, bio-
prediction of criminal behavior should not be the
most pressing source of ethical concern. Second, we
have investigated whether biocognitive classifications
of antisocial behavior offer rational grounds for
stigma or negative self-evaluation. We have denied the
existence of these grounds, by showing that these clas-
sifications do not imply essentialism, immutability,
and determinism.
Our conclusions, however, cannot be seen to
amount to unqualified and general defense of adopt-
ing biomarker-based classification of antisocial disor-
ders. We have, in fact, signaled several interrelated
empirical and ethical issues that need clarification and
further investigation. However, we also think that we
have given some reasons for optimism by showing
that, per se, the adoption of a biomarker-based classi-
fication does not have the ethically problematic conse-
quences that some have envisaged.
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